Liberty Is Independence From the Majority's Tyranny

John Stuart Mill on Social and Political Philosophy. Addressing the Nature of Liberty: What is Liberty?

[Class Notes for Philosophy 1 Students; Exam III]

A Glimpse of Mill and his Argument:  

In arguing against the repression if any opinion, Mill sets forth the following argument: If an opinion is suppressed, and it is true, then we lose the opportunity of exchanging truth for falsehood. If an opinion is suppressed, and it is false, then we lose the opportunity of obtaining a clearer conception of our own position. Hence, there shouldn’t be any censorship of political speech. 
 

Liberty Is Independence From the Majority's Tyranny

• The subject of this essay is on Civil, or Social, Liberty:the nature and limits of the power which can be legitimately exercised by society over the individual.
 

• Mill presents two ways in which the patriots limitations on the ruler's power: (1) by obtaining a recognition of certain immunities, called political liberties or rights, which it was to be regarded as a birch of duty for the rule to infringe; (2) the establishment of constitutional checks by which the consent of the community was made a necessary condition to some of the more important acts of the governing power.

• The will of the people practically means the will of the most numerous or the most active part of the people; the majority, or those who succeed in making themselves accepted as the majority.

• Society can and does executive its own mandates: and if it issues wrong mandates instead of right, or any mandates at all in things with which it ought not to meddle, it practices a social tyranny. The tyranny of the major poses such dangers: because it penetrates deeply into details of life, it leaves fewer means of escape. There needs protection against the tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling; against the tendency of society to impose its own ideas and practices as rules of conduct on those who dissent from them; to fetter the development, and, if possible, prevent the formation of any individuality not in harmony with its ways.

• There is a limit to the legitimate interference of collective opinion with individual independence; and to find that limit, and maintain it against violation (or encroachment), is as indispensable to a good function of human affairs, as protection against political abuse of power (p. 426).

• All that makes existence valuable to anyone depends on the enforcements of restraints upon the action of other people.

• Men's opinions, accordingly, on what is praiseworthy or blameworthy, are affected by all the various causes which influence their wishes in regards to the conduct of others, and which are as numerous as those which determine their wishes on any other subject (p. 426)

• Another grand determining principle of the rules of conduct has been the inclination of mankind towards the supposed preference or aversions of their temporal master, or of gods.

• The object of his essay is to assert one very simple principle as entitled to govern absolutely the dealings of society with the individual. This principle is, that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering either the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection (p. 428). That the only purpose for which the power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community against his will is to prevent harm to others.

• Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign. 

•  Things which are obviously a man's duty to do, he may be rightfully made responsible to society for not doing (p. 429) [to best understand this argument read the second paragraph of p. 429; Mill gives specific examples]

• It comprises, first, the inward domain of consciousness; demanding liberty of conscience; liberty of thought and feeling; absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects, practical or speculative, scientific, moral, or theological. This element of liberty deals solely with the individual's inter-freedom. The liberty of expressing and publishing opinions may seem to fall under a different principle, since it belongs to that part of the conduct of an individual which concerns other people; but, being almost of as much importance as the liberty of thought itself, it is practically inseparable from this first constituent of liberty. 

• Secondly, the principle requires liberty of tastes and pursuits; of framing the plan of our life to suit our own character; of doing as we like, subject to each consequence as it may follow; without harming our fellow creatures even though they may not agree with our conduct or deem it foolish.

• Thirdly, the freedom to unit, for any purpose not involving harm to others: the persons combining being supposed to be of full age, and not forced or deceived.